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I. INTRODUCTION
The investigations of the 9/11 terrorist attacks highlighted a
series of lapses in intelligence-sharing within the federal government
regarding terrorist operations.
One area closely examined by
Congress,' the judiciary, 2 and many legal and political commentators 3
is the appropriate scope of intelligence collection within the United
States "concerning foreign threats to the nation's security" ("foreign
intelligence"). 4
Domestic intelligence collection is a particularly
complex sphere of national security as gathering intelligence on
American soil requires balancing the privacy rights of individuals
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment against the nation's need to
protect itself.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA")
governs the conduct of electronic surveillance and physical searches
carried out for foreign intelligence purposes within the United States. 5
FISA establishes procedures for collecting foreign intelligence
information, which are parallel to, and independent of, the
conventional law enforcement channels used to secure judicial
approval for searches and electronic surveillance. 6
Under FISA,
federal investigators submit applications for foreign intelligence
surveillance to a secret court that exists for the sole purpose of
reviewing government requests to gather information pursuant to the
7
statute.
Prior to 2002, the courts (including the FISA court) only
authorized searches and/or surveillance under FISA where collecting
foreign intelligence information was the "primary purpose" of the
investigation. 8 This primary purpose test was intended to facilitate
the collection of foreign intelligence and limit the use of FISA as an

1.
E.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001) [hereinafter Patriot Act].
2.
E.g., In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.

Supp. 2d. 611 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. 2002).
3.
E.g., Craig S. Lerner, The USA Patriot Act: Promoting the Cooperation of Foreign
Intelligence Gatheringand Law Enforcement, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 493 (2003).
4.
For the purposes of this Note, "foreign intelligence" includes any information concerning
threats to the nation's security from abroad. Such information may concern foreign governments
or terrorist organizations composed mainly of foreign nationals. This category specifically
excludes information regarding United States citizens or groups composed thereof.
5.
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-71 (2004).
6.
Id.
7.
50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2004).
8.
E.g., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77 (2d Cir. 1984).
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end-run around obtaining a normal search warrant. 9 Enforcing the
primary purpose test required courts to discern whether an
investigation was conducted primarily for intelligence collection or for
law enforcement purposes. 10 Repeated judicial inquiries into the
motives behind FISA investigations eventually led the Justice
Department to establish formal procedures for handling FISA
information to ensure that such investigations were not being used to
pursue criminal targets."
After the 9/11 attacks, the Patriot Act amended several
sections of FISA.' 2 Most notably, the Patriot Act allows FISA
investigations where collecting foreign intelligence is a "significant
purpose" of the collection effort.1 3 In 2002, the reach of FISA was
expanded even further when the FISA Court of Review struck down
the primary purpose test altogether.' 4
After this decision, the
government could collect foreign intelligence for use as evidence in a
15
criminal prosecution.
The new FISA regime shifts surveillance requests away from
the Fourth Amendment scrutiny of Article III judges and into the
hands of the Justice Department and the secret FISA tribunal.
Concededly, balancing the government's need to protect the country
from further terrorist attacks with the Fourth Amendment's
guarantee of privacy is not an easy task. A new FISA regime that
incorporates the Patriot Act amendments need not, however, discard
twenty-five years of judicial analysis regarding the proper role of
FISA-derived evidence in criminal prosecutions. It is essential that
courts rethink the primary purpose doctrine in a manner that
effectuates the Patriot Act's purpose of ensuring better intelligencesharing.
Part II of this Note describes the evolution of the executive
power to collect foreign intelligence from the earliest days of the

9.
See United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 915-16 (4th Cir. 1980) (discussing the
importance of granting the executive sufficient discretion to fulfill its responsibility to collect
foreign intelligence).
10. See id. (rejecting a test in which the government's sole purpose for the investigation was
to gather foreign intelligence because "[a]lmost all foreign intelligence investigations are in part
criminal investigations").
11. See generally Memorandum from Attorney General Janet Reno to the Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division (July 19, 1995), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/
doj/fisal1995procs.html [hereinafter Reno memorandum].
12. E.g., Patriot Act, supra note 1, §§ 206, 207, 215, 218.
13. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2004).
14. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 727 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. of Review
2002).
15. Id.
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Republic through the Congressional response to 9/11.
Part III
analyzes the decision of the FISA Court of Review to interpret the
original 1978 FISA statute so broadly as to render unnecessary the
changes implemented by Congress in the Patriot Act.
Part IV
proposes that courts should closely scrutinize government attempts to
introduce FISA-derived evidence in criminal prosecutions.
Such
scrutiny is necessary because the present system inadequately
protects individuals from unreasonable searches, as guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The HistoricalPower of the President to Collect Information
Regarding Threats Posed by Foreign Powers
Despite the Fourth Amendment's command that "[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,"16
for much of the nation's history, courts have allowed the executive
branch to exercise near absolute power in the collection of information
regarding foreign threats. 17
The willingness to bypass Fourth
Amendment scrutiny is grounded in the notion that subjecting the
government to the probable cause standard needed to obtain a
criminal warrant could "unduly frustrate the efforts of Government to
protect itself."18
Constitutional support for such power to enact
unfettered surveillance in the pursuit of foreign intelligence
information derives from the executive's designation as "the preeminent authority in [the conduct of] foreign affairs." 19 In a case
involving executive surveillance of a domestic threat to the
government, the Supreme Court noted that
the President of the United States has the fundamental duty, under Art. II, § 1, of the
Constitution to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."
Implicit in that duty is the power to protect our Government against those who would
subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means.
In the discharge of this duty, the
President ... may find it necessary to employ electronic surveillance to obtain

16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
17. William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security
Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000).
18. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972).
19. United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 914 (4th Cir. 1980).
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intelligence information
on the plans of those who plot unlawful acts against the
20
Government.

The different standards applied to the government's attempts
to procure intelligence information and information on criminal
activity can be explained by the different means of obtaining the two
types of information as well as the information's ultimate use.
Compared to investigating violations of criminal law, collecting foreign
21
intelligence information requires an extreme degree of secrecy.
Further, with few exceptions, the ultimate goal of foreign intelligence
collection is the protection of U.S. interests, not the criminal
22
prosecution of the individuals targeted for search or surveillance.
These differences led the Supreme Court to acknowledge that the
requirements for traditional criminal warrants might not be
23
applicable in the counter-intelligence context.
The history of government involvement in intelligence matters
can be traced to the early days of the Revolutionary War, when the
Continental Congress established the Committee for Secret
Correspondence. 24 President George Washington had significant
experience managing military intelligence operations during the
Revolutionary War. 25 Accordingly, after taking office, he sought to
26
centralize the collection of information within the executive branch.
In his first State of the Union address, Washington specifically
requested an appropriation for intelligence operations and Congress
complied. 27 Most early Presidents followed Washington's example by
closely guarding the specifics of intelligence collection at home and
abroad. 28 In response to strong executive action in initiating and
20. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 310.
21. Sce id. at 319 (noting that "secrecy is the essential ingredient in intelligence gathering")
(internal citation omitted).
22. See id. at 318-19 (noting that the government contended courts should not apply Fourth
Amendment standards to foreign intelligence operations because they are almost never meant to
gather evidence for criminal prosecutions).
23. See United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 322. ('Verecognize that domestic security
surveillance may involve different .. considerations from the surveillance of 'ordinary crime."').
For instance, information collected by the executive branch regarding the actions of foreign
intelligence services and terrorist organizations would be of little value if the collection target
had to be notified of a search prior to or commensurate with its execution. Banks & Bowman,
supra note 17, at 5. The Court's observation regarding counter-intelligence is clearly dicta, since
the case before it concerned the collection of information about purely domestic threats to
national security.
24. Banks & Bowman, supra note 17, at 10-11.
25. Id. at 15.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 17.
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managing covert intelligence activity, Congress generally deferred to
29
the belief that such power was vested in the executive.
The executive branch continued to engage in the type of foreign
intelligence collection later authorized by FISA in the years prior to
World War I. In 1915, President Woodrow Wilson initiated a
surveillance program, administered by the Secretary of the Treasury,
30
which targeted the German and Austro-Hungarian diplomatic corps.
Information gleaned from these wiretaps, supplemented with British
intelligence, led to the expulsion of several German intelligence
31
officers posing as diplomatic officials.
In the 1920s and '30s, J. Edgar Hoover, the first director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI" or the "Bureau"), consolidated
the responsibility for domestic intelligence in the Bureau. 32 While the
FBI's primary mission was to investigate violations of federal law, it
also had a presidential mandate to monitor the activities of groups
deemed subversive to the interests of the United States. 33 These
intelligence operations were distinct from the FBI's primary mission
as they were exclusively defensive in nature and not intended to help
prove violations of federal law. 34 The FBI's authority to conduct wideranging counter-intelligence operations continued to expand after the
conclusion of World War II, when the FBI assumed expanded powers
35
in the name of defending the nation against subversive activity.
The virtually unfettered executive power to collect information
related to perceived threats to the government continued relatively
unabated until the early 1970s. At that time, Congress began to
investigate the extent of violations of individuals' privacy interests by
intelligence officials in the United States. 36 The resulting Church
Committee Report detailed extensive surveillance of individuals who
did not pose a threat to national security.37
Following these
revelations, Congress and the courts undertook a series of steps to
provide a more measured constitutional and statutory framework for
intelligence collection.

29. Id. at 18.
30. Id. at 19-20.
31. Id. at 20.
32. Id. at 26.
33. Id. at 26-27.
34. Id.
35. Id, at 28-29.
36. Sharon H. Rackow, Comment, How the USA Patriot Act Will Permit Governmental
Infringement upon the Privacy of Americans in the Name of "Intelligence"Investigations, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 1651, 1666 (2002).
37. Id.
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B. Constitutionalityof Electronic Surveillance and the Development of
the Foreign Intelligence Exception
Prior to the 1967 Supreme Court decision in Katz v. United
States,3 8 electronic surveillance by government officials was not
considered a "search or seizure" and thus was exempt from
constitutional review.3 9
The Court reasoned that electronic
surveillance did not constitute a search because it did not require an
invasion of physical space belonging to an individual. 40 Furthermore,
the Court had previously held that intangible things such as a
person's words could not be "seized" in a manner that triggered Fourth
41
Amendment protections.
Katz reflected a shift in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence from
the protection of physical space to the protection of individual
privacy. 42 The determining factor in whether a search or seizure was
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection lay not in the physical
location of an object or action, but in the individual's "reasonable
expectation of privacy" in that location. 43 Employing this privacybased reasoning, the Supreme Court in Katz held that a listening
device attached to the outside of a public phone booth was subject to
Fourth Amendment scrutiny when the prosecution sought to introduce
evidence gleaned from the wiretap against the defendant. 44 While
Katz dramatically limited the ability of law enforcement officers and
prosecutors to employ wiretaps and other means of electronic
surveillance, the decision specifically reserved judgment on the power
of executive branch officials to employ electronic surveillance in
45
foreign intelligence operations.
38. See 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967) (reviewing precedent that previously left electronic
surveillance outside of "search" or "seizure").
39. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (reasoning that a telephone
wiretap fell outside of a Fourth Amendment analysis).
39. See id. at 463-64 (distinguishing cases involving physical entry into a defendant's home
or office from the present case where "voluntary conversations" were "secretly overheard"
without physical entry into the defendant's property.).
41. See id. at 464-66 (reasoning, inter alia, that a person meant his words to move outside
of his home when he spoke on a telephone because telephone wires and connection equipment
existed primarily outside of the confines of his residence).
42. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (rejecting the significance of a "constitutionally protected
area" in Fourth Amendment analysis and asserting that "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places").
43. See id. at 351-52 ("But what [appellant] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.").
44. Id. at 353-54.
45. See id. at 358 n.23 ("Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate
would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a question
not presented by this case.").
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Shortly after Katz, Congress enacted warrant procedures for
the use of electronic surveillance in law enforcement investigations as
part of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968.46 Title III authorizes law enforcement officers to use electronic
surveillance pursuant to a court order 47 in the investigation of a
specified list of crimes. 48 The statute provides that judges shall only
grant surveillance warrants where "there is probable cause for belief
that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit
a particular offense." 49 Surveillance under a Title III warrant is
limited to thirty days (although extensions may be granted) 5° and the
subject of electronic surveillance must be notified of the surveillance
within 90 days of its termination. 51 Like Katz, Title III exempted the
collection of foreign intelligence from the limits imposed on "normal"
electronic surveillance:
Nothing contained in this chapter... shall limit the constitutional power of the
President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against
actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign
intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to
protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall
anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the
President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the United States
against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or against
52
any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government.

The Court concluded that, while broad in scope, the exception to the
normal warrant requirement outlined in § 2511(3) did not apply to
53
warrantless surveillance in domestic security investigations.
In United States v. United States District Court, the Supreme
Court held that warrantless surveillance of individuals suspected of
conspiring to bomb a CIA office in Michigan violated the Fourth
54
Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure.
46. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2004).
47. Title III also contains an emergency exception that empowers law enforcement officers
to establish electronic surveillance under certain conditions. The officers then have 48 hours
from initiation of the emergency surveillance to obtain a court order authorizing the surveillance.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (2004).
48. See id. § 2516 (listing the offenses where federal officials may apply for a surveillance
warrant).
49. Id. § 2518(3)(a).

50.
51.

Id. § 2518(5).
Id. § 2518(8)(d).

52. Id. § 2511(3) (repealed 1978).
53. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972) (holding that
the "Government's concerns do not justify departure... from the customary Fourth Amendment
requirement of judicial approval prior to initiation of ... surveillance" in a criminal prosecution
for bombing a CIA office in Michigan).
54. Id.
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The Court acknowledged the constitutional duty of the President to
"preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States"
and noted that various Presidents had authorized warrantless
surveillance in the exercise of this duty. 55 However, in balancing the
duty of the government to protect domestic security with the danger to
individual privacy posed by warrantless searches, the Court
determined that, where the threat to security is entirely domestic,
"[t]he circumstances.., do not justify complete exemption.., from
prior judicial scrutiny."56
Like Katz and Title III, the Court
specifically disclaimed the possibility that its holding hindered the
ability of the executive branch to conduct warrantless surveillance of
57
the activities of foreign powers or their agents.
Lower courts further modified. the foreign intelligence
exception to Title III's warrant requirement to apply only where the
collection of foreign intelligence was the primary purpose of the
warrantless wiretap. 58 In United States v. Truong, the Fourth Circuit
balanced the government's need to collect foreign intelligence
information with the rights of an accused when the government seeks
to introduce evidence obtained in a foreign intelligence wiretap
against an individual in a criminal proceeding. 59 The Fourth Circuit
conducted a balancing test similar to the one in United States District
Court, but concluded that "[a] warrant requirement would add a
procedural hurdle that would reduce the flexibility of executive foreign
intelligence initiatives, in some cases delay executive response to
foreign intelligence threats, and increase the chance of leaks
regarding sensitive executive operations." 60 Furthermore, the court
determined that because the executive requires such flexibility in the
execution of its foreign affairs duties, "the courts should not require
the executive to secure a warrant each time it conducts foreign
61
intelligence surveillance."
Importantly, the Truong court acknowledged that the power of
the executive branch to collect foreign intelligence information was

55. Id. at 310.
56. Id. at 320.
57. Id. at 321-22.
58. See United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 915 (4th Cir. 1980) (limiting the application
of the foreign intelligence exception to situations where "the object of the search or the
surveillance is a foreign power, its agent or collaborators").
59. See id. at 912 (identifying the issue before the court as a balance between the "the
legitimate need of Government to safeguard domestic security" and "whether the needs of
citizens for privacy and free expression may not be better protected by requiring a warrant").
60. Id. at 913.
61. Id. at 914.
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subject to the competing privacy interests of the Fourth Amendment. 62
Truong involved a prosecution of two U.S. residents (one a U.S.
citizen) on espionage charges for passing classified documents to
agents of the North Vietnamese government during negotiations to
end the Vietnam War. 63 The charges were based on extensive
surveillance of the defendants, including a continuous wiretap of
defendant Truong's phone for 255 days; however, at no time did the
64
government seek or obtain court authorization for the wiretap.
The Fourth Circuit conducted a functional analysis of the
relative competencies of the executive and judiciary branches and
determined that, as long as an investigation is focused primarily on
the collection of foreign intelligence, warrantless wiretaps are
constitutional and can be introduced as evidence in criminal
proceedings. 65 When the focus of the investigation turns to a criminal
investigation of individual suspects, however, the courts are
competent to conduct Title III determinations of whether there exists
a sufficient factual basis for the authorization of electronic
surveillance. 66 Evidence collected from warrantless wiretaps whose
primary purpose was something other than collection of intelligence
(e.g. to implicate an individual for violating a criminal statute) could
67
not be admitted at trial under the Fourth Amendment.
Applying its new primary purpose test, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the government's investigation of the defendants began
as a foreign intelligence operation; however, it transformed into a
primarily criminal investigation when the Criminal Division of the
Justice Department assumed control of the case from the various
intelligence agencies that had initiated the surveillance. 68
The
prosecution could therefore properly introduce evidence obtained from
the wiretaps before the investigation became primarily law
69
enforcement in nature.

62.
63.
64.
65.
65.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 915.
at 911-12.
at 915.

at 916.
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C. FISA Becomes the Modern Approach to Domestic Intelligence
Collection
In response to the court decisions identifying a foreign
intelligence exception to the Title III warrant requirement and the
70
abuses of that exception uncovered by the Church Committee,
Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.71
The Act provided a statutory framework for domestic intelligence
collection "to insure that electronic surveillance by the U.S.
Government within this country conforms to the fundamental
72
principles of the Fourth Amendment."
FISA created two new Article III courts, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") and the Foreign Intelligence
Court of Review ("FISA Court of Review" or "Court of Review"), to
consider applications by executive branch officials for electronic
surveillance operations intended to collect foreign intelligence. 73 The
statute directs the FISC to grant surveillance orders where it finds
that there is probable cause to believe that "the target of surveillance
is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power." 74 The term "foreign
power" is defined broadly by the statute and includes foreign
governments, factions of foreign nations, and groups "engaged in
international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor." 75 The
executive official submitting the application must also certify that
information sought through the surveillance is not available through
normal investigative means and that a significant purpose of the
76
proposed operation is to obtain foreign intelligence information.

70. Rackow, supranote 36, at 1666.
71. Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 301, 92 Stat. 1782, 1798 (1978).
72. S. Rep. No. 95-604, at 15 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3916. While
FISA originally dealt exclusively with electronic surveillance, the statute was later amended to
permit physical searches to collect foreign intelligence information. The standard and procedure
for physical searches pursuant to FISA is the same as those for electronic surveillance. 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1822-23 (2004).
73. The Act creates a two-tier system of judicial review for proposed FISA orders. The
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) is composed of 11 federal district judges and
hears all applications for surveillance or search orders under FISA. If the FISC denies a
proposed order, the government can appeal to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review (Court of Review or FISA Court of Review), which is composed of three federal district or
circuit court judges. A denial of a FISA order by the Court of Review can be appealed to the
Supreme Court. Appointments to both FISA courts are public and are the exclusive province of
the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2004).
74. Id. § 1805(a)(3)(A).
75. Id. § 1801(a).
76. Id. § 1804. FISA originally required that the executive officer certify that the "purpose"
of the surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence information. The Patriot Act amended this
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The requirements for FISA surveillance orders and Title III
warrants differ in significant ways pertinent to Fourth Amendment
analysis. First, unlike Title III, FISA does not require any showing of
probable cause to believe a crime is about to be or has been committed;
the probable cause requirement under FISA is limited to establishing
a connection between an individual and a broadly defined "foreign
power." 77
Second, Title III limits the duration of surveillance
warrants (and 'each subsequent extension) to 30 days, 78 while a single
79
FISA order can permit electronic surveillance for up to one year.
Title III also requires that targets of electronic surveillance be notified
80
in writing within 90 days of the termination of the surveillance,
whereas under FISA, the targeted party is not entitled to view the
application for surveillance even if the evidence ripens into a criminal
8l
prosecution.
The use of FISA evidence in criminal prosecutions has been
held constitutional under the Fourth Amendment by every court that
has considered the issue.8 2 While the Supreme Court has not ruled on
the constitutionality of FISA-obtained evidence, courts confronting the
issue have read the Supreme Court's decision in United States District
Court to imply that "the warrant requirement is flexible and that
different standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment in
light of the different purposes and practical considerations of domestic
national security surveillances."8 3 In a recent opinion, the FISA Court
of Review compared the requirements for a Title III warrant and a
FISA order, concluding that "in many significant respects the two
statutes are equivalent" and "to the extent a FISA order comes close to
meeting Title III... [this] certainly bears on its reasonableness under
84
the Fourth Amendment."
section of FISA to allow for surveillance where the collection of foreign intelligence is a
"significant purpose" of the surveillance. Id.
77. Id. § 1805(a)(3)(A).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2004).
79. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e) (2004).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (2004).
81. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (2004); see also United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 67-73 (2d Cir.
1984) (describing the court's in camera review of evidence procured subsequent to a FISA order
and the court's decision that the procedures mandated by FISA comport with the Fourth
Amendment).
82. E.g., United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 790-92 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 59 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Nicholson, 955 F. Supp. 588, 589 (E.D.
Va. 1997).
83. Duggan, 743 F.2d at 72.
84. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 741-42 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. of Review
2002). Like the FISC, the Court of Review is established by FISA and provides a secret forum for
the government to appeal decision by the FISC.
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Judging by the volume of FISA requests, electronic surveillance
for foreign intelligence purposes is a routine undertaking of the
executive branch. Since its enactment in 1978, there have been more
than 10,000 applications for FISA orders, and only one has been
turned down.8 5 The number of applications to the FISC has increased
in recent years, topping 1,000 in the year 2000, a rate of nearly three
applications per day.8 6 Figures for FISA orders are only slightly lower
than the rate of applications for Title III electronic surveillance
warrants, which averaged approximately 1,100 per year between 1991
and 2001.87
D. PrimaryPurpose Test Survives FISA Which Leads to
Department of Justice "Wall"
While FISA gave statutory approval to the foreign intelligence
exception, the primary purpose test established in United States v.
Truong limited its potential effect.88 A number of courts confronted
with questions regarding the admissibility of FISA surveillance held
that the primary purpose test applied to evidence obtained under the
new statute.8 9 One such court observed, "[a]lthough evidence obtained
under FISA subsequently may be used in criminal prosecutions, the
investigation of criminal activity cannot be the primary purpose of the
surveillance. The Act is not to be used as an end-run around the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of warrantless searches." 90
The Truong court had held that the primary purpose of a
surveillance operation could be determined by ascertaining the point
at which law enforcement officers assumed control of the investigation
from the intelligence officers who initiated it.91 On the basis of this
reasoning, the Justice Department decided that criminal prosecutors
85.

NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTI-TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 419 (lst ed. 2003).

Note that the figures for FISA orders include both new applications and requests for extension of
existing orders.
86. Id. at 420.
87. Id.
88. The Troung court held that the Fourth Amendment required that any surveillance
conducted pursuant to the foreign intelligence exception must be conducted for the primary
purpose of collecting intelligence (as opposed to mounting a criminal investigation) in order for
the fruits of the surveillance to be admissible at trial. 629 F.2d 908, 915 (4th Cir. 1980). Truong
was decided after FISA became law, but the case arose prior to 1978; thus the statute was not at
issue in the Fourth Circuit's decision.
89. E.g., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.3d 59, 77 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Pelton,
835 F.2d 1067, 1076 (4th Cir. 1987).
90. United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1991) (internal citations
omitted).
91. Truong, 629 F.2d at 916.
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could receive briefings on information gleaned from FISA surveillance
but could not control its collection. 9 2 In practice, this arrangement
proved workable until the 1994 espionage prosecution of Aldrich
Ames.
The Ames investigation featured widespread exchanges of
FISA-derived information between intelligence officers and the law
enforcement personnel responsible for prosecuting the case. 9 3 After
the case was resolved by plea bargain, Attorney General Janet Reno
drafted new procedures to manage the flow of FISA material within
the Justice Department. 94 The procedures were submitted to the
FISC as the Department's new minimization procedures, as required
by the FISA statute. 95 In approving the minimization procedures, the
FISC predicted the regulations would promote "broad information
sharing and coordination [between the intelligence officers and] the
Criminal Division." 96 Over time, however, the procedures resulted in
far less information sharing than had occurred previously because the
Justice Department's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review ("OIPR")
became the sole gatekeeper of FISA information. 97 The information
flow withered so badly that the Department's FISA procedures became
98
known simply as "the Wall."
The procedures set forth by Attorney General Reno in 1995,
and subsequently adopted by the FISC, aimed to preserve the
admissibility of surveillance information obtained in the course of
FISA investigations that uncovered evidence of criminal activity. 99 To
that end, the FBI was charged with notifying prosecutors in the
Justice Department's Criminal Division of any criminal information
uncovered in the course of a foreign intelligence operation.1 0 0 Once
notified, prosecutors could offer "guidance" to the FBI, but were not to
"instruct the FBI on the operation, continuation or expansion of FISA
92. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 78 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].

93. Id.
94. See generally Reno memorandum, supra note 11.
95. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp.
2d 611, 619 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. 2002). Minimization procedures seek to
prevent the unauthorized disclosure of FISA derived information by limiting the acquisition and
retention of such information. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2004). The Justice Department's
minimization procedures are required to be approved by the FISC. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(5),
1823(a)(5) (2004).
96. In re All Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 619.
97. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at 79.
98. Id.
98. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 727-28 (describing the 1995 procedures as an
attempt "to avoid running afoul of the primary purpose test..
100. Reno memorandum, supra note 11, at A6.
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electronic surveillance or physical searches."'10 1
Communication
between the two groups was to be coordinated by OIPR 10 2 to ensure
that prosecutors did not assume control of the investigation. 10 3 The
procedures also required OIPR to inform the FISC of any contacts
between the FBI and the Criminal Division. 10 4 In cases where there
were joint foreign intelligence and criminal investigations, the FISC
would condition FISA renewals on the establishment of "Wall"
procedures, which prevented criminal investigators from reviewing
raw FISA material, "lest they become de facto partners in the FISA
10 5
surveillances and searches."
In practice, such "Wall" procedures proved very difficult to
maintain and resulted in conflict between the FBI and the FISC over
inappropriate sharing of FISA information. 0 6 In early 2000, the
Justice Department formally notified the FISC of the unauthorized
dissemination of FISA material in four or five cases. 0 7 Later that
year, the Justice Department admitted that there were additional
mistakes contained in 75 FISA applications related to investigations
108
of potential terrorist attacks against the United States.
In other instances, the "Wall" procedures were interpreted by
the FBI as instituting impenetrable barriers between agents working
on intelligence investigations and their colleagues working on criminal
matters.1 0 9 Pressure from the Justice Department and the FISC to
ensure rigid FISA compliance eventually led to "walls" being erected
between agents serving on the same squads." 0 The 9/11 Commission
cited these breakdowns in communication as a significant barrier to
the dissemination of intelligence regarding potential terrorist attacks
against the United States in the years preceding the attacks on New
York, Washington, and Pennsylvania."'

101. Id.

102. Id. at A1-A5.
103. United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 916 (4th Cir. 1980).
104. Reno memorandum, supra note 11, at A7.
105. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp.
2d 611, 620 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. 2002).
106. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at 79.
107. In re All Matters, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 620.
108. Id.
109. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 92, at 79.
110. Id.

111. Id. See also In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 744 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct.
of Review 2002) ("FISA court requirements based on Truong may well have contributed, whether
correctly understood or not, to the FBI missing opportunities to anticipate the September 11,
2001 attacks.").
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The uneven application of the "Wall" procedures was an
inevitable outgrowth of the false dichotomy between the pursuit of
foreign intelligence, on one hand, and investigations into criminal
wrongdoing, on the other. 112 The notion that the two types of inquiries
could be kept distinct, first promulgated by the Fourth Circuit in
Truong, ultimately led the FISC to become involved in the internal
workings of the FBI and the Justice Department. 113 This type of
judicial intervention severely restricted the executive branch's ability
to foster cooperation among all of its counter-intelligence personnel,
11 4
including those pursuing criminal investigations.

E. 9/11 prompts Congress to amend FISA
Although many people within the Justice Department and FBI
had grown frustrated with the state of FISA procedures during the
late 1990s, 11 5 changes to FISA did not become a political reality until
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The attacks exposed how intelligence
1 6
coordination failures contributed to the country's vulnerability.1
Congress intended the changes promulgated in the Patriot Act to
enhance FBI and Justice Department collaboration in cases where
11 7
foreign intelligence and law enforcement purposes intersected.
Section 218 of the Patriot Act amends § 1804(a)(7)(B) of FISA,
118
changing the "purpose" standard for all new FISA applications.
Under the old FISA, federal officials who applied for FISA orders had
to certify that the purpose of the proposed surveillance was the
collection of foreign intelligence.1 1 9 The Patriot Act lowered the bar by
allowing officials to obtain a FISA order by showing that the collection
120
of foreign intelligence is a significant purpose of the investigation.
The final wording of § 218 was the result of a compromise between the

112. See id. at 743 ("[C]riminal prosecutions can be, and usually are, interrelated with other
techniques used to frustrate a foreign power's efforts.").
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Lerner, supra note 3, at 504 (discussing a pre-9/11 Justice Department lobbying
effort to amend FISA to allow for more robust information sharing between intelligence officers
and Criminal Division investigators); see also 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at 79
("Separate reviews in 1999, 2000, and 2001 concluded independently that information sharing
was not occurring.").
116. See generally Patriot Act, supra note 1.
117. Lerner, supranote 3, at 504.
118. Patriot Act, supra note 1, § 218.
118. Id.
120. Id. (emphasis added).
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more sweeping amendment sought by the Justice Department and the
status quo favored by civil libertarians. 121 The new significant
purpose standard, which is not defined in the Patriot Act, was
intended to improve the access of law enforcement officials to FISA
information but prevent criminal prosecution from becoming the
122
primary purpose of FISA surveillance.
The Patriot Act also included several provisions intended to
improve the exchange of FISA-derived information between
intelligence and law enforcement officials. For example, Section 504
of the Act explicitly allows intelligence officers who conduct electronic
surveillance to consult with law enforcement personnel to protect
against "actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power." 123 In all of its changes,
the Patriot Act made clear Congress's intent to allow more liberal use
of FISA procedures, but the courts were left the task of determining
just how liberal its application should be.
III. BEYOND CONGRESS'S WILDEST DREAMS: FISA COURT OF REVIEW
RE-INTERPRETS 1978 ACT
A. A Secret Court Finds that the PatriotAct Does Not Go Far Enough
In the first published opinion in its history, In re Sealed Case,
the FISA Court of Review overturned twenty-five years of FISA case
law. 124 The court interpreted the pre-Patriot Act version of the statute
to allow the use of FISA procedures to collect evidence of "foreign
intelligence crimes." 125 In light of the FISA amendments contained in
the Patriot Act, the Court of Review concluded that the "significant
purpose" language enabled federal agents to collect FISA material for
the purpose of prosecuting criminal activity as long as a foreign
intelligence angle was also present. 126 Therefore, "[i]f . . . the
application's purpose articulates a broader objective than criminal
prosecution - such as stopping an ongoing conspiracy - and includes
121. See Lerner, supra note 3, at 504-05 (noting that the Justice Department proposed
amending FISA's purpose standard to grant FISA orders where the collection of foreign
intelligence was "a purpose" of the proposed surveillance).
122. Id. at 505.
123. Patriot Act, supra note 1, § 504(a).
123. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. of Review
2002).
125. Id. at 724.
126. See Id. at 734-35 (interpreting FISA to allow surveillance "even if 'foreign intelligence' is
only a significant-not a primary-purpose").
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other potential non-prosecutorial responses, the government meets the
127
statutory test."
The FISA Court of Review was not content with the FISA
standard set forth in the Patriot Act; accordingly, it set its sights on
the primary purpose doctrine. It traced the evolution of the primary
purpose doctrine to Truong and held that this limitation on the use of
information obtained outside normal Title III warrant requirements
did not survive after the passage of FISA.128 The primary purpose test
was not constitutionally required, according to the Court of Review,
because it rested on a "false dichotomy" of foreign intelligence
information versus law enforcement evidence. 129 The collection of
foreign intelligence and the investigation of criminal activity rested on
the unstated assumption that "the government seeks foreign
intelligence ... for its own sake - to expand its pool of knowledge because there is no discussion [in any of the FISA cases] of how the
government
would use that information
outside criminal
prosecutions."'' 30 In overturning the primary purpose doctrine, the
Court of Review, sitting ex parte, implicitly overruled the Fourth
13 1
Amendment holdings of numerous FISA cases.
The Court of Review's Fourth Amendment analysis in In re
Sealed Case rested on a lengthy comparison of the requirements for
Title III electronic surveillance warrants and FISA orders.1 32 The
analysis addressed the three elements of the Fourth Amendment's
warrant clause: (1) the approval of a neutral magistrate, (2) the
requirement that the warrant's proponent demonstrate probable cause
that "the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or
conviction" and, (3) the requirement that the target of the warrant be
described particularly.1 3 3
The court found substantial similarity
between Title III and FISA for the first element: both statutes require
the approval of a judge before a warrant for electronic surveillance can
be issued, 134 and even though it operates in secret, the FISC is
135
considered a "detached and neutral body."

127. Id. at 735.
128. Id. at 724-26.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 727.
131. E.g., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Pelton, 835
F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458 (11th Cir. 1987).
132. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 737.
133. Id. at 738 (citing Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979)).
134. 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (2004); 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2004).
135. United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Addressing the second element, the court found that although
both Title III and FISA require the proponent of a warrant or order for
electronic surveillance to demonstrate probable cause, the required
showings differ. 136 Title III requires the proponent to demonstrate
probable cause that the target is about to commit or has committed
one of the crimes enumerated by the statute. 137 FISA, on the other
hand, requires probable cause that the target is "a foreign power or
agent of a foreign power." 138 Elsewhere in the statute, the definition of
"agent of a foreign power" includes a reference to criminal activity, but
under a standard much lower than probable cause. 13 9 This lower
standard of evidence reflects a congressional judgment that foreign
intelligence crimes are more difficult to detect. 140 The Court of Review
reasoned that this lower standard is offset by the FISA requirement of
probable cause to believe that the target is working for a foreign
power. 141
FISA and Title III also differ significantly with regard to the
Fourth Amendment requirement that a target of surveillance be
described with particularity. FISA's only nod to this requirement is
that FISA orders are only available for the collection of foreign
intelligence. 142 Title III, on the other hand, requires probable cause
43
that communications indicative of a specified crime will be obtained,
but does not require the proponent to identify any information about
the individual targeted by the surveillance. 1 44 Based on what it
perceived as the relative balance in protections afforded under Title
III and FISA, the Court of Review concluded that "to the extent a
FISA order comes close to meeting Title III... [this] certainly bears
145
on its reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment."'

136. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2004); 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3) (2004).
137. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2004).

138. The probable cause showing is subject to the limitation that a citizen or permanent
resident of the United States may not "be considered a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of
the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (2004).
139. An agent is anyone who "knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering
activities for or on behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a violation of
the criminal statutes of the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(A) (2004) (emphasis added).
140. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 739 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. of Review
2002).
141. Id.

142. Id. at 740.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(b) (2004).

144. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 740 (citing United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 157
(1974)).
145. Id. at 742.
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The broad FISA powers recognized by the Court of Review were
welcomed by federal prosecutors. 146 Attorney General Ashcroft made
available "millions of pages of existing FISA evidence" to federal
prosecutors and claimed that the court victory would "revolutionize
our ability to investigate terrorists."1 47 Despite predictions that the
exposure of intelligence sources and methods would discourage such
disclosures, 148 FISA-derived evidence has begun surfacing in
149
prosecutions across the country.
B. The New FISA: A Much Needed Improvement or Ripe for OverReaching?
In its decision overhauling the FISA landscape, the Court of
Review stressed that the primary purpose test had frustrated the
purpose of the FISA by unduly restricting the executive branch's
ability to protect the country from foreign threats. 50 The line that
had been initially drawn by the Truong court between acceptable and
unacceptable purposes "rested on a false premise" that as the
government proceeds with a criminal prosecution, its foreign
intelligence "purpose" wanes.' 5 1 The various statutory references to
criminal activity, according to the Court of Review, make clear that
Congress "did not preclude or limit the government's use... of foreign
intelligence information, which included evidence of certain kinds of
criminal activity, in a criminal prosecution."'' 52 For instance, FISA's
definition of foreign intelligence information includes evidence of
crimes such as espionage, sabotage, or terrorism. 5 3 Furthermore, the
statutory definition of "an agent of a foreign power" is in part based on
the presence of criminal conduct.' 54

146. See Glenn R. Simpson & Jess Bravin, Prosecutors Capitalize on Increased Access to
Wiretap Evidence, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2003, at A4 ("Law enforcement authorities say such
[FISA] information - previously unavailable for criminal prosecutions - is breathing new life into
numerous antiterrorism cases or significantly strengthening them.").
147. Id.
148. Id.

149. See id. (describing the use of FISA information in prosecutions in New York, Illinois,
Florida, and Texas); see also David Rosenweig & Greg Krikorian, Ex-Agent Indicted in Spying
Probe, L.A. TIMES, December 11, 2004, at B1 (identifying a case in which FISA-authorized
evidence was admitted into evidence); Mark Hamblett, Stewart Jury Watches First Tapes of
Meeting with Client in Prison, N.Y. L.J., August 15, 2004, at 1 (same).
150. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 744-45.
151. Id. at 743.
152. Id. at 727 (emphasis in original).
153. Id. at 723.
154. Id.
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The Court of Review also criticized the "Wall" procedures
adopted by the FISC for perhaps contributing to the vulnerability of
the United States. 155 "Effective counter-intelligence," the Court of
Review explained, "requires the wholehearted cooperation of all the
government's personnel who can be brought to the task."156 The 9/11
Commission went one step further, explicitly linking the dearth of
information sharing that resulted from the "Wall" procedures to the
1 57
government's ignorance of the 9/11 plot.
Professor Craig Lerner contends that the Court of Review's
decision appropriately returns the question of the balance between
15 8
national security and privacy rights to Congress and the executive.
For support, Lerner points out that over time, this balance had been
distorted by the misguided implementation of the "Wall" procedures,
particularly in the day-to-day management role performed by the
FISC.15 9 This tug-of-war between the secret court and the executive
branch obscured the widely recognized executive power to carry out
warrantless surveillance in the pursuit of foreign intelligence
information. 160 The resolution of conflicts between this inherent
power and the consequent compromises to privacy rights is a "political
question," according to Professor Lerner, and should not be resolved
"ina secret chamber of unelected judges themselves appointed by an
161
unelected judge."'
Critics of the Patriot Act amendments to FISA and the
subsequent decision by the FISA Court of Review argue that resultant
improvements in intelligence coordination do not justify the potential
that FISA will be employed as an end-run around the Fourth
Amendment.1 62 Instead of foisting the balance between privacy and
national security on the elected branches, civil libertarians assert:
155. See id. at 744 (discussing congressional testimony suggesting that "the FISA court
requirements based on Truong may well have contributed, whether correctly understood or not,
to the FBI missing opportunities to anticipate the September 11, 2001 attacks").
156. Id. at 743.
157. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at 78-79.
158. Lerner, supra note 3, at 512.
159. See id. at 510 ('The patent inability of the FBI and DOJ to maintain walls separating
inextricably intertwined investigations might have alerted the FISA [court] to the
wrongheadedness of the prevailing interpretation. Instead, the FISA court hewed ever more
fixedly, and quixotically, to an interpretation that was revealed as unworkable.").
160. Id. at 511.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Rackow, supra note 36, at 1675; Jennifer C. Evans, Hijacking Civil Liberties:
The USA PatriotAct of 2001, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 933, 974-75 (2002) ("The wiretapping and
intelligence provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act improperly minimize the role of judges in
ensuring that law enforcement wiretapping is conducted legally and permits intelligence
authorities to bypass procedures that protect people's privacy.").
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"When the overriding purpose of a surveillance request is unclear,
preserving the privacy interests of a potentially innocent target should
be a higher priority than facilitating the receipt of surveillance
16 3
authority."
The Fourth Amendment entrusts the protection of individuals
from invasions of privacy by law enforcement officials to the judiciary.
Recasting this question as political ignores the history of executive
overreaching in the name of foreign intelligence collection. The
expansion of executive power under the amended FISA regime sets in
motion a conflict that the Constitution demands be settled with due
regard for privacy interests. 164 On the other hand, returning to the
pre-9/11 status quo cannot be considered a practical option in light of
the highly critical findings of the 9/11 Commission.

C. The Court Is Correct on One Count: The Pre-9/11 System was
Broken and Requires Fixing
In its drive to rigidly adhere to the "Wall" procedures, the
Justice Department (with help from the FISC) created an enforcement
regime so complex and cumbersome that its own personnel were often
unable to comply with it.165 Unfortunately, the problems related to
information sharing were not exposed until the 9/11 investigations
clearly demonstrated the lack of coordination that plagued the
intelligence community. 66 In 2000 alone, the Justice Department
confessed to the FISC more than 80 instances in which its officials had
not complied with the minimization procedures it promulgated in the
wake of the Aldrich Ames investigation. 167
Even when the FISA process was a viable route, the time
involved in obtaining the necessary bureaucratic approvals often
rendered the information obsolete.1 68
The bureaucratic inertia
surrounding FISA information became so dire that, in some cases, FBI
agents assigned to FISA investigations were not sharing information
163. Rackow, supra note 36, at 1680.
164. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967) ("Few threats to liberty exist which are
greater than that posed by the use of eavesdropping devices.").
165. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp.
2d 611, 620-21 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. 2002).
166. See generally 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92.
167. Id.
168. See Lerner, supra note 3, at 503 (explaining that even if FBI headquarters would have
approved a FISA request from its Minneapolis field office to search the laptop computer of
Zacarias Moussaoui, the alleged 20th hijacker of 9/11, the internal FISA approval process would
not have been completed by September 11).
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with agents on their squad who were attempting to build a criminal
case. 169 The misunderstandings surrounding FISA also gave rise to
the misguided belief within the FBI that intelligence information,
regardless of its source, could not be shared with agents working on
criminal investigations. 170 As a result, relevant information the FBI
had received from intelligence agencies, such as the CIA and NSA,
7
was withheld from criminal investigators.1 1
Given this backdrop of bureaucratic infighting and lack of
coordination, the need to streamline FISA procedures in the wake of
9/11 is apparent. Through the amendments included in the Patriot
Act, Congress emphasized the need for FISA orders to be more readily
attainable 72 and for the information obtained pursuant to FISA
orders to be shared more liberally within the government. 173 These
changes, while significant, did not fundamentally alter the existing
line between intelligence collection and law enforcement that served
as the baseline for the Wall procedures. Not content to merely
interpret the Patriot Act amendments, the Court of Review overturned
twenty years of Fourth Amendment case law relative to FISA in an ex
parte proceeding. Two amicus briefs provided the only opposing voices
174
considered by the court.
D. FISA Court of Review Decision Overreaches
In its overhaul of FISA procedures, the Court of Review
correctly recognized that the interpretation of the primary purpose
test embodied in the "Wall" procedures resulted in a wholly
unsatisfactory and often ineffective enforcement process. 175 The
stagnant flow of information, and its effects on the government's
169. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 92, at 79.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See Patriot Act, supra note 1, § 218 (amending the FISA requirement that the collection
of foreign intelligence information be the "purpose" of a surveillance order to the lower standard
that the collection of such information be "a significant purpose" of the surveillance).
173. See id. at § 504(a) (providing for consultation between federal officers who collect foreign
intelligence information and law enforcement officials when certain conditions are met; id. at §
905 (requiring the Justice Department to share foreign intelligence information acquired in the
course of a criminal investigation with the Director of Central Intelligence).
174. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 719 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. of
Review 2002) ("Since the government is the only party to FISA proceedings, we have accepted
briefs filed by the American Civil Liberties Unions and the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers as amici curiae.").
175. See id. at 743 ("A standard which punishes... cooperation could well be thought
dangerous to national security.").
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ability to protect the nation, has been explored in detail by
176
independent investigations before and after the 9/11 attacks.
The Court of Review appropriately criticized the FISC for not
affording sufficient deference to the Patriot Act amendments in an
earlier decision: "We ... think the refusal by the FISA court to
consider the legal significance of the Patriot Act's crucial amendments
was error."177 However, instead of outlining the effect of the Patriot
Act amendments, the Court of Review turned back the clock more
than twenty years to attack the primary purpose test.1 78 In doing so,
the court expressly acknowledged that rescinding the division between
intelligence collection and law enforcement rendered the intent behind
the Patriot Act amendments paradoxical because the Act recognized
just such a dichotomy. 179 That conundrum was resolved by a rather
creative episode of statutory interpretation, which concluded that the
debate over the significance of the division was largely academic. The
court noted that "typically [the government] will not have decided
whether to prosecute the agent [who is the target of FISA
surveillance]. So long as the government entertains a realistic option
of dealing with the agent other than through criminal prosecution, it
18 0
satisfies the significant purpose test."
This new significant purpose test, while arguably easy to meet
in any investigation involving foreign intelligence, is defensible in
light of the Patriot Act amendments.
The Court of Review
overreached, however, in holding that the determination of the
significance of the foreign intelligence purpose should be left to the
executive branch official who certifies the FISA application. 8 1 Thus,
in reviewing FISA applications, the FISC is prohibited from making
any factual inquiry into the status or staffing of the Justice
Department investigation in an effort to examine the true purpose
motivating the request for a FISA order.18 2 This concentration of

176. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at 78-79; see also In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d
at 727 (citing pre-9/1 reports by the General Accounting Office and a team appointed by the
Attorney General to review the Los Alamos National Laboratory Investigation and noting that
both reports criticize the lack of coordination between intelligence officers and law enforcement
officials that resulted from rigid enforcement of the 1995 procedures).
177. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 732.
178. See id. at 742-45 (characterizing the analysis in Troung as resting "on a false premise"
and deriding the primary purpose test as "inherently unstable, unrealistic, and confusing").
179. See id. at 734-35 ("[P]aradoxically, the Patriot Act would seem to conflict with the
government's first argument because by using the term 'significant purpose,' the Act now implies
that another purpose is to be distinguished from a foreign intelligence purpose.").
180. Id. at 735.
181. Id. at 736.
182. Id.
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decisionmaking authority in the executive branch relative to a much
weaker "significant purpose" standard removes the possibility of any
meaningful judicial oversight of executive actions pursuant to the
foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement.
The Court of Review's equation of requirements for obtaining a
FISA order and a Title III surveillance warrant also deserves closer
examination.
The probable cause requirements for the two
determinations differ significantly: Title III requires probable cause to
believe a crime has been or is about to be committed, whereas FISA
mandates probable cause that the target of surveillance is an agent of
a foreign power. 183 The designation of "agent of a foreign power" can
be made for any of a number of reasons, but there is no requirement
that the application present any reason to believe that a crime has
occurred or is imminent. 184
Thus, under FISA, a surveillance
application can be approved where the target's actions "may involve"
criminal activity, 185 a considerably lower standard than the Title III
probable cause requirement. Allowing government surveillance under
such a low showing in every conceivable FISA case is incompatible
86
with the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement.
The notion that the Court of Review appropriately returned the
question of how to balance national security and the privacy rights of
individuals to the elected branches is reminiscent of earlier times in
U.S. history when the executive branch routinely cited its national
security power as license to initiate wide ranging surveillance
operations. 87 FISA established limits on a previously unchecked
executive power and empowered the judiciary to oversee compliance
with the statutory scheme indicating that Congress sought to rein in
national security surveillance.18 8 If a reconsideration of the balance
between national security and privacy is warranted, Congress should
initiate this through legislation (as it did in the Patriot Act) and the
judiciary should review and interpret this legislation through the

183. See supra text accompanying note 74.
184. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(a) (2004).
185. Id.
186. See supra text accompanying note 133 (enumerating elements of a Fourth Amendment
search warrant); see also Grayson A. Hoffman, Note, Litigating Terrorism: The New FISA
Regime, the Wall, and the Fourth Amendment, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1655, 1672-74 (2003)
(providing a detailed critique of the Court of Review's probable cause analysis).
187. See generally Banks & Bowman, supra note 17 (detailing the history of Executive
surveillance pursuant to its national security powers).
188. See ABRAMS, supra note 85, at 418 ("Viewed against this historical backdrop, rather
than expanding federal authority, FISA can be seen as a statute that reined in the Executive
Branch, regulating a kind of electronic eavesdropping that previously had been uncontrolled by
the judiciary.").
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normal adversarial process.
Review by a secret court, where
constitutionally guaranteed interests are represented only by amicus
briefs, does not give full airing to the privacy concerns implicated by
the Patriot Act's FISA amendments.
IV. SOLUTION: STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF SIGNIFICANT PURPOSE IN
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

Where a prosecutor seeks to introduce evidence obtained
through FISA in a criminal proceeding, Fourth Amendment concerns
will inevitably arise.
Thus, the analysis of the constitutional
framework for the "new" FISA revolves primarily around the role of
foreign intelligence information in the criminal process. This Section,
therefore, is limited to the question of when FISA-derived information
18 9 It
can constitutionally be introduced against a criminal defendant.
also provides a comprehensive proposal for how the amended FISA,
including the provisions related to intelligence coordination, should
operate in practice.
A. Returning to the Truong FunctionalAnalysis
In its pre-FISA analysis, the Truong court drew on the relative
competencies of the executive and judiciary in outlining the scope of
the foreign intelligence exception. If it is indeed true that FISA
embodied Congress's attempt to rein in the executive intelligencegathering power, 190 the Troung analysis is an appropriate starting
point for determining the constitutional scope of the post-Patriot Act
FISA. 19 1
Since regular Article III courts "possess expertise in making
the probable cause determination involved in surveillance of suspected
criminals, 1 92 judicial review under Title III should be utilized to
review all search applications where the government seeks to initiate
electronic surveillance in criminal investigations.
When the

189. For the sake of clarity, the analysis will be limited to the introduction of FISA-derived
evidence against United States citizens.
190. ABRAMS, supra note 85, at 418.
191. The FISA Court of Review took a different approach, casting aspersions on Troung (e.g.,
"[w]e reiterate that Troung dealt with a pre-FISA surveillance..."), and ignoring its functional
analysis altogether. Instead, the court took aim at the notion that foreign intelligence concerns
and law enforcement interests were mutually exclusive and concluded that FISA amplified the
Executive power by creating a process that "approaches a classic warrant and [is] therefore ...
constitutionally reasonable." In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 742-45. (Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Ct. of Review 2002).
192. United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980).
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government investigates a crime, whether it be espionage or armed
robbery, that it suspects has already occurred, for instance, courts are
well-suited to make probable cause determinations.
The courts are, however, "unschooled in diplomacy" and thus
not functionally equipped to "judge the importance of particular
information to the security of the United States."19 3 As the FISA
Court of Review explained, the government's law enforcement concern
in procuring intelligence information is to stop or frustrate the
immediate criminal activity: "Punishment of the terrorist or espionage
agent is really a secondary objective; indeed, punishment of a terrorist
is often a moot point."'1 94 The FISA process should therefore be
reserved for instances in which the executive branch targets ongoing
foreign threats. The primary objective is neutralizing the threat; any
prosecution that results is clearly a secondary effect.
A functional approach to the authorization of electronic
surveillance would restore the balance between FISA, Title III, and
the Fourth Amendment. Under the limited circumstances where the
executive branch gathers foreign intelligence information that is later
relevant in a criminal proceeding, deference to the FISA process is
In all other investigative contexts, the Fourth
reasonable. 195
Amendment mandates that the privacy interests of individuals are a
Title III is thus the appropriate process for
foremost concern.
authorizing electronic surveillance because it was designed to protect
the Fourth Amendment concerns inherent in such intrusive
observation.
B. Rethinking the Role of the FISC
In order to accomplish the dual objectives of improving
intelligence coordination and complying with the Fourth Amendment,
analysis of the constitutionality of FISA information should be
conducted in the mainline Article III courts where prosecutors seek to
introduce FISA-derived evidence. This judicial review would occur in
the context of motions to exclude evidence in criminal trials. The new
FISA, furthermore, should not impede intelligence-sharing within the
executive branch. Any breakdown in intelligence coordination, similar
to what occurred in the aftermath of the "Wall" procedures, would
193. Id. at 913-14.
194. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 744-45.
195. This view is slightly different than the primary purpose formulation that originated in
Truong, because as the Court of Review pointed out, investigating an ongoing instance of a
foreign intelligence crime such as espionage, while primarily a criminal investigation, demands
the flexibility that FISA provides.
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handicap the government's ability to defend against large-scale
terrorist attacks.
The desired balance between the government's intelligence
collection powers and the Fourth Amendment rights of an accused is
difficult to achieve.
Once FISA-derived evidence is presumed
admissible in criminal trials, it is difficult to restrict the evidence's use
to certain types of criminal investigations.
Without restrictions,
however, FISA becomes a tempting avenue for criminal investigators
to gather information when they are unable to (or prefer not to) meet
Title III's more demanding standards.
This determination is
particularly problematic under the amended FISA because the Patriot
Act provides no indication of what constitutes the significant foreign
196
intelligence purpose necessary to obtain a FISA surveillance order.
The FISC is ill-equipped to determine the constitutionality of
each FISA application. It is not functionally prepared to balance the
Fourth Amendment concerns inherent in the nearly 1,000 applications
for surveillance it receives each year. The FISC was established to
afford significant deference to the executive in the field of foreign
intelligence collection' 97 because mainline Article III courts were not
considered competent "to judge the importance of particular
information to the security of the United States."'198 Since its creation,
this secret court has demonstrated that it is no better equipped to
balance intelligence needs against the rights of subsequent defendants
than district courts. The FISC's attempts to distinguish between
foreign intelligence investigations and criminal investigations by
analyzing which part of the Justice Department was involved in a
particular case were quite possibly unconstitutional' 99 and ultimately
20 0
resulted in the flow of FISA information withering to a virtual halt.
Instead of conducting a searching review of each FISA
application, the FISC should limit its review to ensuring that each
request facially meets the statutory criteria (e.g., significant foreign
intelligence purpose, probable cause to believe that the target is an
agent of a foreign power). It is not realistic to expect the court to serve
196. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2004). This statute was amended by the Patriot Act to
require "that a significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence
information." Id.
197. See United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77 (2d Cir. 1984) ('"The FISA Judge, in
reviewing the application, is not to second-guess the executive branch official's certification that
the objective of the surveillance is foreign intelligence information.").
198. United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 914 (4th Cir. 1980).
199. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 731 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. of
Review 2002) ("[The FISA court may well have exceeded the constitutional bounds that restrict
an Article III court.").
200. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 92, at 79.

2005]

THE REVAMPED FISA

1699

as an effective constitutional gatekeeper. By definition, the court
relies on certifications provided by executive branch applicants and is
20 1
relatively isolated from effective review.
If the FISC review is limited to checking that the certifying
officer has correctly completed the FISA application, district courts
must recognize the expanded reach of FISA. Accordingly, they must
conduct more searching Fourth Amendment reviews when a
prosecutor seeks to admit FISA-derived evidence in a criminal
proceeding. In the course of these reviews, evidence must only be
admitted if the prosecution demonstrates that the FISA evidence was
uncovered in the course of protecting the country from foreign powers.
C. Applying a New (and Improved) FISA Standard
Reviews of FISA-derived evidence by traditional Article III
courts should be conducted under an abuse of discretion standard.
This standard recognizes that the judiciary owes some degree of
deference to the foreign intelligence decisions of the executive branch
and the FISC. The review should also be flexible so that courts can
consider those factors that are most indicative of the government's
foreign intelligence purpose in a particular case. The information
evaluated should include which subdivisions of the Justice
Department were involved in the investigation.
This type of
consideration should not be confused with the judicial interference in
the affairs of the Justice Department that the Court of Review
suggested violated separation of powers principles.
Instead, the
consideration of which investigators were involved in the case should
be a flexible inquiry that constitutes one of a number of factors a court
considers in determining whether information was legitimately
obtained under a FISA order. Other factors include the scope of the
investigation that resulted in the prosecution, the nature of the
pending charges, and whether the information sought pursuant to the
FISA order was more appropriately the subject of a Title III request.
The new FISA standard will necessarily leave a significant
amount of discretion to trial courts, but language from the FISA itself
can help determine whether evidence was obtained in the course of a
legitimate intelligence operation.
For instance, the statutory
definition of "foreign intelligence information" includes information
related to a number of potential criminal activities such as sabotage,

201. See Rackow, supra note 36, at 1671 (noting that the FISC has denied only one request
in its history and approved more than 1,000 orders in 2001 alone).
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terrorist acts, and clandestine intelligence activities. 20 2 This new
standard will, therefore, be different from the primary purpose test in
that it will not require a bright line between criminal prosecution and
collecting foreign intelligence information, the two of which sometimes
intersect. 20 3 Thus, when the government prosecutes an individual for
activity closely related to the type of criminal activity described by the
statute, the admission of FISA-derived evidence should be admitted
since no Fourth Amendment concerns are implicated. 20 4 For instance,
there should be little controversy over the admissibility of FISAderived evidence when the government seeks to introduce it in an
20 5
espionage prosecution against a CIA officer.
The government could also satisfy the new FISA standard by
showing that, at the time the FISA order was obtained, there existed
probable cause to conclude that the defendant was an agent of a
foreign power as defined by the statute. 20 6 This standard could be
easily met in a case like Truong, for instance, where the investigation
involved espionage and there was probable cause to believe that the
defendant was an agent of a foreign government. 20 7 Once again, the
analysis here is cleaner and more faithful to the FISA than the
primary purpose test; if the FISA order was supportable by probable
cause linking the defendant to a foreign power, the abuse of discretion
208
standard cannot be met.
In opposing the admission of FISA-derived evidence, the
defendant will be free to argue that the evidence presented against
him was not obtained with a "significant purpose" of collecting foreign
intelligence.
If a trial court determines that the FISA order in
202. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1) (2004).
203. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 727 ("The government's overriding concern is to stop
or frustrate the.., foreign power's activity by any means, but if one considers the actual ways in
which the government would foil espionage or terrorism it becomes apparent that criminal
prosecution analytically cannot be placed easily in a separate response category.").
204. Another option would be to amend FISA to allow automatically (or establish a rebuttal
presumption in favor of) the admission of evidence obtained pursuant to the statute when it is
introduced against a defendant charged with certain enumerated offenses, including foreignbased terrorism, espionage, etc.
205. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at 78 (describing Justice Department
concerns that the primary purpose standard jeopardized the admissibility of a significant
amount of FISA-derived evidence in the espionage prosecution of Aldrich Ames).
206. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (2004) (authorizing the issuance of a FISA order when
there is probable cause to believe that the target of surveillance is an agent of a foreign power);
50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (2004) (defining "agent of a foreign power").
207. See generally United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
208. See Lerner, supra note 3, at 500 (describing the concern of many within the law
enforcement and intelligence communities that much of the evidence against Aldrich Ames was
susceptible to challenge because it was obtained pursuant to a FISA order while the
investigation was being directed by law enforcement officials).
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question lacked the requisite purpose and instead constituted an

abuse of discretion, Fourth Amendment considerations compel the
suppression of the evidence. Such a challenge might be successful if
the crime being investigated was only tenuously connected to the
foreign intelligence purpose specified in the FISA order. For instance,
a FISA order to investigate drug trafficking by a street gang on the
basis that one of the gang's leaders is a Muslim convert who
periodically worships at a mosque that is suspected of ties to terrorism
would be suspect. To admit evidence obtained as a result of the order,
the prosecutor would have to show that a significant purpose of the
investigation was to procure foreign intelligence information. 20 9 Based
on the facts provided, a judge could find that the FISC abused its
discretion in issuing the order.
Requiring district courts to conduct this expanded
determination will require more scrutiny than previously required
under FISA; however, the judiciary is well equipped to make this sort
of Fourth Amendment determination. This expanded review will also
improve upon the paradigm used by the Court of Review to balance
the Fourth Amendment rights of the accused against the government
interest in increased coordination of foreign intelligence collection.
Under the regime proposed by the Court of Review, the scrutiny of
government certifications would be cursory at both the FISC and the
trial stage, thus risking the wholesale disregard of Fourth
Amendment considerations in FISA cases.
V. CONCLUSION

Implementing any FISA regime entails delicately balancing the
government's need for foreign intelligence with the Fourth
Amendment interests of individuals targeted by federal surveillance.
In order to effectuate the "significant purpose" language of the Patriot
Act amendments to FISA, courts need flexibility in determining
whether FISA-derived evidence is properly admitted at trial. An
abuse of discretion standard that provides courts with a range of
factors to analyze will allow courts to better decide cases where
foreign intelligence issues are clearly in play. It will also give courts
the guidance they need to make admissibility decisions in tougher
cases under the existing statutory scheme.

209. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2004).
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The need for a new FISA standard is clear in light of the
existing alternatives. The primary purpose doctrine originated from a
sound analysis of the relative competencies of the executive and the
judiciary, but it evolved into a test in which the outcome depends
entirely on which type of law enforcement agents were involved in an
investigation at a specific point in time. In addition to being unwieldy,
this intrusive inquiry contributed directly to the intelligence failures
underlying the 9/11 attacks. Similarly handicapping the government
now would risk another catastrophic intelligence failure in addition to
ignoring the changes to FISA contained in the Patriot Act.
On the other hand, the FISA Court of Review's decision flipped
the balance too far in the opposite direction. By implementing a
standard that goes beyond any conceivable intent of the Patriot Act's
drafters, the Court of Review has established a system where FISC
review is cursory and trial court review is practically non-existent.
The fact that a secret court sitting ex parte saw fit to pass judgment on
the constitutionality of its expansive reading of FISA under the
Fourth Amendment indicates, at a minimum, that the court's decision
deserves very close scrutiny.
The well-documented abuses that occurred in the name of
foreign intelligence-gathering in the pre-FISA period suggest that
deference to the executive in such matters poses significant risks. 2 10
While the need to improve intelligence collection and coordination in
the post-9/11 environment is undeniable, history counsels that courts
should ease the restrictions on the executive branch only after careful

consideration. 211

210. See Rackow, supra note 36, at 1666 (describing how, before FISA, "the absence of clear
statutory or judicial standards led to widespread warrantless electronic surveillance of
individuals who were not associated in any way with a foreign power, did not seem to pose a
threat to national security, and were not suspected of being involved in criminal activity").
211. See id. at 1694-95 (cautioning that the invocation of the needs of government during
wartime to increase intelligence collection has led to significant deprivations of civil rights).
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A functional balance between FISA and the Fourth
Amendment can only be struck when traditional Article III courts
analyze the intersection of these competing concerns in various factual
contexts. As it stands now, however, courts must continue to grant
significant deference to the executive branch in the foreign
intelligence context, while also establishing a mechanism to stop the
executive branch from pursuing its intelligence goals into
unconstitutional areas. The proposed Article III review process would
ensure that these competing interests are balanced appropriately.
J. ChristopherChampion*
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